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ABSTRACT 
This paper augments the basic Post-Keynesian markup model to examine the effects of 
different fiscal policies on prices and income distribution. This is an approach à la Hyman P. 
Minsky, who argued that in the modern era, government is both “a blessing and a curse,” 
since it stabilizes profits and output by imparting an inflationary bias to the economy, but 
without stabilizing the economy at or near full employment. To build on these insights, the 
paper considers several distinct functions of government: 1) government as an income 
provider, 2) as an employer, and 3) as a buyer of goods and services. The inflationary and 
distributional effects of each of these fiscal policies differ considerably. First, the paper 
examines the effects of income transfers to individuals and firms (in the form of 
unemployment insurance and investment subsidies, respectively). Next, it considers 
government as an employer of workers (direct job creation) and as a buyer of goods and 
services (indirect job creation). Finally, it modifies the basic theoretical model to incorporate 
fiscal policy à la Minsky and John Maynard Keynes, where the government ensures full 
employment through direct job creation of all of the unemployed unable to find private sector 
work, irrespective of the phase of the business cycle. The paper specifically models Minsky’s 
proposal for government as the employer of last resort (ELR), but the findings would apply 
to any universal direct job creation plan of similar design. The paper derives a fundamental 
price equation for a full-employment economy with government. The model presents a “price 
rule” for government spending that ensures that the ELR is not a source of inflation. Indeed, 
the fundamental equation illustrates that in the presence of such a price rule, at full 
employment inflationary effects are observed from sources other than the public sector 
employment program.  
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With the rise and fall of Keynesian economics, belief in the ability of government to 
stabilize the economy also waned. In reality, however, theoretical debates notwithstanding, 
government represents a large share of the economy, thereby making it well suited to offset 
declines in private spending and investment by discretionary action. Prior to the Great 
Depression, total federal government spending comprised less than 3 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP), and after ballooning to 46 percent during World War II, it settled to 
about 27 percent in 2010.
1  Big Government along with its Big Bank (i.e., the Central Bank 
with its expanded new functions, such as the lender of last resort), as Minsky used to call 
them, are here to stay (Minsky 1986).   
This paper presents a framework for thinking about the comparative macroeconomic 
advantages and disadvantages of alternative fiscal policies. Recall that, for Keynes, the very 
reason for the existence of fiscal policy was to correct the two outstanding faults of society, 
namely: 1) its failure to produce and preserve full employment; and 2) its inability to secure a 
more equitable income distribution. The paper evaluates different fiscal policies in light of 
their ability to address these two fundamental problems. Note that when Keynes advocated 
an expanded role for government in the context of its objective to secure full employment, he 
did not advocate just any kind of big government. He favored fiscal policy via direct public 
employment programs both in contractions and in expansions (Tcherneva 2011, 2012). 
Direct job creation and public investment are no longer the policies of first resort when 
dealing with unemployment and business fluctuations. Indeed, income support to households 
                                                 
1 This figure includes transfer payments to households, and states and subsidies to firms, which do not enter the 
GDP calculations. It is a gross figure that does not account for total government receipts. If it did, the federal 
government’s net dissaving (i.e., the federal government deficit) would equal 9 percent of GDP in 2010.  3 
(in the form of unemployment insurance and tax rebates) and to firms (in the form of direct 
subsidies, accelerated depreciation, and tax cuts) are the favored stabilization policies. In 
addition, government itself is a large consumer of goods and services and thus a provider of 
demand and cash flows to the private sector. So the question here is: Can we develop a 
skeletal model for analyzing the comparative advantages and disadvantages of these 
alternative fiscal policies with an eye to their ability to secure full employment and their 
impact on prices and income distribution? 
To develop this framework, the paper utilizes and augments the basic two- and three-
sector pricing models that are the hallmark of Post Keynesian analysis. The specific 
presentation of the mark-up pricing model here can be largely traced to the work of Kalecki 
(1971). The approach can also be found in Kregel (1973) and Minsky (1986). It will be 
argued that, among a range of options, certain contemporary government policies produce 
relatively more inflationary and inequitable outcomes even as they aim to produce high (or 
full) employment. Other policies, by contrast, are better  suited for achieving full 
employment while, at the same time, they stabilize prices and yield better income 
distribution. 
This paper extends a previous argument made in Tcherneva (2011, 2012) that 
targeted labor demand policies are more effective than aggregate demand management in 
connecting fiscal policy with the full employment objective. We now add another link in the 
chain to illustrate how such policies are also less inflationary and more equitable. 
Conventional aggregate demand management policies are not only a misapplication of the 
original Keynesian blueprint for full employment (Ibid.), but over the decades have 4 
contributed to the erosion of income distribution in the US (Minsky 1968, 1973, 1986). 
Keynes himself alluded to the difficulties of attaining and maintaining full employment via 
pumping more aggregate demand, but he did not explicitly juxtapose the aggregate demand 
and targeted labor demand approaches to full employment in fleshing out their relative 
macroeconomic merits.
2 Thus, the first objective of the paper is to develop a simple Post-
Keynesian framework that allows us to evaluate the comparative merits of different fiscal 
policies.
3  
The second objective is to model a type of fiscal policy that is more consistent with 
the original Keynesian proposal. As I have argued elsewhere (Tcherneva 2011, 2012), 
Keynes had a very specific proposal for full employment over the long run, which can be 
called an “on-the-spot” employment approach that consisted of directly employing the 
unemployed into public works. One could argue that this proposal was later reinterpreted by 
Minsky as the “employer of last resort” (ELR) proposal. Thus, the paper will use the Post-
Keynesian framework presented here to examine the impact of the ELR proposal on 
employment, prices, and income distribution.  
Finally, although Minsky derived a foundational price equation for an economy with 
government (following Kalecki), he did not derive such an equation for a full-employment 
                                                 
2 Again, “aggregate demand” here refers to any broad-based government stimulus that would include tax 
rebates, investment subsidies, income transfers, and generalized purchases of goods and services by 
government, whereas “targeted labor demand” refers specifically to directly employing the unemployed into 
useful public sector projects. For details, see Tcherneva 2011. 
3 For such a comparison, the work of Hyman Minsky is particularly useful for several reasons. Firstly, Minsky 
utilizes the Kaleckian profits approach, which straddles well macroeconomic-analysis with micro-outcomes. 
The Kaleckian approach, which underpins much of the Post-Keynesian theory of income distribution, cannot be 
separated from a theory of price determination (Kregel 1971, 1973), which makes it especially suitable for our 
purposes. This framework lends itself to analyzing the absolute and relative distribution of income and 
employment across sectors. The analysis could also be used for studying market structure and market power in 
the determination of income and employment, which would be an extension of the present work.  
 5 
economy with government. Thus, the third objective of the present paper is to derive such an 
equation that models the “on-the-spot” employment/ELR proposal. This equation contributes 
to the ELR literature by adding additional support to the claims about the countercyclical and 
price-stabilization effects of such a policy. Many ELR scholars have argued that if 
governments spent on a “fixed price-floating quantity” rule, the ELR itself would not be a 
source of inflation (save for a potential one-time adjustment in prices) (e.g., Mosler 1997-98; 
Wray 1998). Mitchell (1998) has empirically demonstrated that a direct job creation program 
à la ELR with a buffer stock mechanism would stabilize the price of the buffer stock, i.e., 
wages. Fullwiler (2003, 2005) and Majewski (2004) have simulated the ELR using the Fair 
macroeconomic model and have found a countercyclical stabilizing impact of the program on 
prices. Additionally, Tcherneva and Wray’s study of the direct job creation program in 
Argentina Plan Jefes—which was not a universal ELR, but was nevertheless modeled after 
the ELR proposals developed in the US—exhibited a countercyclical stabilizing feature both 
on the economy and on wages (see, e.g., Tcherneva and Wray 2005).  
The foundational equation in this paper develops a straightforward baseline scenario 
that demonstrates this price-stabilization effect using Kalecki’s model. More importantly, it 
explicitly illustrates the importance of the “price-rule” that “on-the-spot” employment/ELR 
policies must follow to ensure that they stabilize, rather than aggravate, inflation. Indeed, the 
paper demonstrates that if such a price rule is followed, inflationary pressures throughout the 
business cycle in a full-employment economy occur from sources other than the government 
employment program. To restate, the ELR program does not eliminate all sources of 
inflation. Demand-side inflation generated by the private sector (e.g., credit expansion, 6 
speculative investment in the housing market) or from other public sector programs (e.g., 
military spending, no-bid contracts), or cost-push inflation (e.g., from speculation in 
commodities, oil embargoes) are still problems to be reckoned with. Nevertheless, the ELR 
can tame current government-stimulated demand-side sources of inflation by replacing pump 
priming policies with a policy that offers a better price anchor at full employment. Various 
taxing schemes can complement the ELR program as additional income distribution and 
inflation-fighting policies. What these tax schemes look like is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but it is an important extension of the present work. 
Finally, the paper concludes that any fiscal policy should follow a “price-rule.” This 
means that regardless of what programs the government spends on, a price-rule will mitigate 
the inflationary effects of contemporary Big Government.  
 
1. GOVERNMENT SPENDING, PRICES AND PROFITS 
As is customary in Post-Keynesian analysis, I will begin with the straightforward two-sector 
model to illustrate some of the basic relationships and mathematical derivations of price 
determination and income distribution. The two-sector model, however, besides its 
simplicity, has several major limitations: as a base case scenario it does not pertain to any 
real-world economy. At a minimum, it describes rare cases where government comprises a 
very small share of the economy (such as in the pre-WWII world). Furthermore, we know 
that the very financing of investment and consumption in the private sector depends, in part, 
on the amount of government liabilities available in the system. Prices, incomes, and profits 
are all denominated in money, which is a state-mediated unit of account. Therefore, a model 7 
without any government is limiting and unrealistic. I will present a three-sector model in the 
next section in which the government spends, taxes, and runs large deficits as is normally the 
case in the postwar world to delineate these very same relationships. I will present several 
scenarios of different government programs and their impact on prices and income 
distribution. While Minsky studied the role of government spending in the determination of 
profits and the markup, he offered only a cursory discussion of the effects of different types 
of government policies on them.  
Government has traditionally had three distinct functions. First, it provides income 
support—a function normally associated with income transfers to the unemployed and the 
poor (e.g., unemployment insurance or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families [TANF]). 
However, government also provides sizeable investment subsidies to companies, which is 
essentially an income transfer policy to firms. I will compare the relative effects of these two 
policies.
4 Secondly, government is an employer when it hires people directly into public 
sector offices. Government can provide employment either by guaranteeing a job to the 
unemployed in a manner in which Keynes and Minsky envisioned (Keynes’s “on the spot” 
employment or Minsky’s ELR) or via a direct job creation policy that does not promise to 
hire all who are ready, willing, and able to work, but unable to find private sector 
employment. Finally, the government is a buyer of goods and services from the private 
sector. This is generally limited to the purchases of investment/production goods in the form 
of large military investments, private infrastructure contracts for civilian purposes, and 
purchases of other goods and services from the private sector. In this context, one could view 
                                                 
4 Government also provides social insurance, food stamps, and other cash assistance, but for simplicity in our 
model, we will only study unemployment insurance and firm subsidies. 8 
government as an indirect employer. Fiscal policies that emphasize each of these different 
government expenditures have various effects on prices and income distribution and they 
affect relative employment and incomes in the separate sectors differently. In all of these 
cases, except the ELR case, full employment is not guaranteed. As is usually the case, less 
than full employment is the normal condition. If each of the other policies aims to produce 
full employment by channeling more funding into their respective priorities (i.e., boosting 
income transfers to firms or households, directly employing more workers, or buying more 
goods and services from the private sector), government spending will amplify their 
respective effects on prices and income distribution. So our first task is to draw a skeletal 
model to begin to discern these effects. To summarize, we will look at: 
•  A basic two-sector model with consumption and investment  
•  A basic three-sector model with consumption, investment, and government, where:  
a)  government spending is a source of income transfers to individuals via 
unemployment insurance 
b)  government spending is a source of income transfers to firms via investment subsidies  
c)  government acts as an employer via indirect job creation through purchases of 
investment goods and services, and 
d)  government acts as an employer via direct job creation but without a commitment to 
provide jobs for all of the unemployed  
e)  government acts as the employer of last resort 
 
The following analysis will also allow for consumption out of profits and saving out 
of wages—two assumptions that often enter Post-Keynesian analysis.
5  In addition, I will 
examine the implications of government spending when it is fixed at a given level by a given 
budget versus when the budget is allowed to float with the amount of unemployment. 
                                                 
5 The famous adage that workers “spend what they get and capitalists get what they spend” as stated by Kalecki 
(1971) and Kaldor (1955-56) was later modified by Pasinetti (1974), who showed that if workers saved, the 
flow of profits runs partly to workers, but aggregate profits remain unchanged. In other words, investment and 
government decisions determine total profits, whereas saving and consumption out of profits determine the 
relative distribution of claims on profit income. 9 
Before I proceed, one important caveat is in order. The Kalecki model is based on 
identities; thus, all I will be showing here are ex-post relationships, whereby the actual 
dynamics can be modeled separately in a stock flow consistent model, e.g., as in Godley and 
Lavoie (2007). 
 
2. THE BASIC TWO-SECTOR MODEL 
Although there are various approaches to price determination and inflation, the emphasis on 
administered price in Post-Keynesian theory frequently evokes the Kaleckian markup 
approach to pricing.
6 The skeletal version of this model assumes that there are two sectors, 
the consumption goods sector (C-sector) and investment goods sector (I-sector). Wages and 
employment in the C-sector (WC and NC, respectively) produce a wage bill (WCNC) associated 
with the production of a given quantity of consumer goods (QC) sold at consumer goods 
prices (PC). The output (PCQC) produced in the C-sector must satisfy the demand for 
consumer goods by both consumer-goods workers (  
 ) and investment-goods workers (  
 ), 
where        
      
 . The C-sector generates profit πC because its sales of goods and 
services exceed the cost of production (the revenue PCQC is greater than the wage bill WCNC).  
Part of that profit is used to buy investment goods from the I-sector, generating profit from 
                                                 
6 Post-Keynesians emphasize that nominal incomes (not quantity of money as in Monetarism) affect the level 
and changes in prices, which are administered and determined on the basis of the goals, which firms with 
market power wish to achieve. Prices are administered on the basis of different cost-plus methods (e.g., full-
cost, normal cost, target-rate of return). The simplest method commonly used in Post-Keynesian analysis is the 
Kaleckian markup approach (Kalecki 1971), where prices depend on unit prime (or direct) costs, and a gross 
margin (i.e., markup at the micro/firm level) is applied to these unit costs, giving us the price of the good 
(Lavoie 1992; Lee 1998). Some price leaders may apply fixed margins, while others may prefer variable 
margins; in the aggregate, however, the Kaleckian approach shows that the macro/economy-wide markup is 
determined by the level and composition of final demand.  10 
investment goods production. If we assume that workers spend their entire income, while 
firms do not consume out of profits (two assumptions that will be relaxed later), we can 
develop the following relationships: 
PCQC = WCNC + WINI   (1) 
The wage bill generated in the C- and I-sectors is spent on consumer goods produced.  
Therefore, the profit generated in the C-sector is equal to the wage bill in the I-sector: 
πC = PCQC - WCNC = WINI   (2) 
Separately, investment goods output sold must pay for the wage bill in the I-sector (i.e., the 
cost of production) and generate profit. 
I = PIQI = WINI + πI   (3) 
or 
πI = I - WINI   (4) 
Combining (2) and (4):  
πC + πI = WINI + I - WINI   (5) 
or 
π = I   (6) 11 
Aggregate profits add up to total investment, producing the famous Kaleckian result that 
consumers spend what they get, while investors get what they spend. In a capitalist/investing 
economy investment determines aggregate profits and prices must carry profits (Minsky 
1986, 142). 
Notation:  
WC and WI – wages in the C- and I-sectors, respectively;  
NC and NI – the number of employed in each sector; 
WCNC and WINI – the wage bills in the C- and I-sectors, respectively; 
πC+πI = π are the profits generated in each sector, which add up to total profit in the 
economy. 
From the above relationships, it is clear that πC would be zero if only workers in C-
sector were to demand consumer goods (i.e., if PCQC = WCNC), but since I-sector workers 
also consume, the C-sector must produce surplus, which will be rationed by the price system 
between the two sources of demand. Another way to look at this relationship is to consider 
the Keynesian insight that in a monetary production economy, all production takes place in 
the pursuit of monetary profit. In other words, even if all workers were employed in the C-
sector and consumed all the goods and services which they produced (i.e., if PCQC = WCNC), 
there will be no incentive to produce because there would be no profits generated from 
consumption goods production. The system simply cannot reproduce itself. Therefore, all C-
sector workers must produce more than they consume, in order for the C-sector to generate 
profit—an impossible outcome if all output is only produced by and sold to C-sector 
workers. Additionally, because firms operate on the basis of administered prices, where they 12 
mark up their direct costs (WCNC, if we ignore the cost of materials) with some targeted rate 
of return, which they expect to receive from production,
7 not all output in the C-sector can be 
sold because workers spend all they earn. Thus, the micro-markup and the macro-markup 
ensure that workers in the C-sector cannot purchase all output. The C-sector will produce 
surplus which will be rationed by the price system. Consumer prices will distribute output, 
employment, and profits across sectors, and will ensure that the system is able to reproduce 
itself.  
To reiterate, the first important Kaleckian insights for our purposes are that: 1) the 
aggregate level of investment in the economy determines the aggregate level of profits; 2) the 
wage bill in the non-consumption goods sector generates profits in the consumption goods 
sector; 3) the C-sector must produce and sell its surplus to generate profit; and 4) the price 
system ensures that (3) takes place. Now we need to show how prices actually do that.  
From (1), above, we derive a price formula for consumer goods which will be our 
simplified foundational equation for all subsequent queries:  
Divide (1) by QC: 
     
    
  
  
    
  
  (7) 
If we multiply and divide the second term in (7) by [
    
    
], we get: 
     
    
  
  
    
  
 
    
    
   (8) 
                                                 
7 This is at the firm (micro) level; see footnote 6. 
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After reworking the equation we get: 
     
    
  
 1   
    
    
   (9) 
  Although (7) and (9) are identical, for ease of exposition, we will be using both 
equations. Equation (7) allows us to trace more easily changes in PC from changes in 
employment and output, while equation (9) allows us to observe the markup over direct 
costs. Equation (9) was used by Minsky, who wanted to relate the consumer prices to wages 
in the C-sector, the ratio of employment and wages between the C- and I-sectors, and to what 
Minsky called AC—the average productivity in the C-sector (where AC = QC/NC). Although in 
the analysis below I will assume, as Minsky did, that a given change in QC brings about a 
proportionate change in NC, I will not speak of “productivity,” per se, to avoid confusion 
with the neoclassical notion. In the latter, all factors of production are paid factor incomes 
based on their marginal productivity, all factor incomes add up to and determine total output, 
and the different relative productivity of each factor of production then determines income 
distribution. In this work, I treat QC/NC as a simple ratio, allowing for QC and NC to change 
with changes in the volume and composition of final demand. Such a treatment is consistent 
with the Post-Keynesian emphasis that total output determines the productivity of different 
factors of production, not the other way around, and also confirms Minsky’s insight that 
“surplus is forced by the investing process and that the distribution between wages and 
profits is determined by the economic process and not by technology” (Ibid., 151).
8 
                                                 
8 For evidence that productivity is a residual of output growth, see Wray and Pigeon (1999). 
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We can therefore express prices in terms of output, employment, and wages in the C-
sector and the relative wages and employment (i.e., the relative wage bills) in the C- and I- 
sectors. If we assume in equation (9) that WC=WI, then prices will depend on the relative 
employment in each sector. The term  1   
    
    
  is the markup required in the C-sector to 
produce the surplus necessary to ration all consumption goods to the different sources of 
demand. In other words, the price level is determined by the composition of final demand.  
The greater the relative employment in non-consumption-goods-producing sectors, the 
greater the markup would be.  
Note that this is an ex-post relationship in which the multiplier is implicit—it 
illustrates what has already happened and how the different sources of demand affect the 
aggregate markup (again, to be distinguished from the individual micro-markup at the firm 
level). When I add government in the subsequent section, I will use this equation to trace the 
effects of alternative fiscal policies on the markup, prices, profits, and income distribution.  
As with any comparative static analysis, there are considerable limitations to this approach, 
as well, but it allows us to examine the immediate and secondary effects of government 
spending.   
Before we examine the three sector model which includes government, let us explore 
what happens to prices, profits, and distribution in response to changes in investment. Let us 
assume that investment collapses. We know from (3) that: 
I = WINI + πI   (3) 
Therefore, 15 
ΔI = ΔWINI + ΔπI   (10) 
In other words, we can expect that both the wage bill and profits from investment will 
decline (in fact, falling expected profits may have been the precursor to the collapse in 
investment). When the wage bill in the investment sector falls (ΔWINI), we expect profits in 
the C-sector to fall by the same amount ΔπC. (Since WINI = πC, then ΔWINI = ΔπC). This 
collapse in C-sector profits will produce a multiplier effect depressing production in the C-
sector, since now I-sector workers are not buying as many C-goods, i.e., part of   
 —the 
consumption goods produced for I-sector workers—goes unsold, which in turn will trigger 
layoffs on the C-sector of workers who used to produce this (now unsold) output. As noted 
above, we will assume, as did Keynes, that %ΔQC = %ΔNC, i.e., changes in output and 
employment in the C-sector are proportionate. 
Thus, with the collapse in investment, the wage bill and profits in the I-sector (WINI 
and πI) fall, C-sector profits (πC) fall, consumption goods output (QC) falls, and the wage bill 
in the C-sector (WCNC) falls as well, which as we will see in a moment must have a 
depressing effect on consumer prices PC.  
Why is this the case? Let us first explain it intuitively and then show it using 
equations (7) and (9). When WINI falls by X%, QC falls by less than that (say Y%, where Y% 
< X%) because a small proportion of QC goes unsold, i.e., a portion of   
 . Thus, we can 
expect WCNC also to fall by a smaller percentage (Y%) because only the portion of the 
workers dedicated to the production of the unsold   
  would be laid off. 
Consider the modified equation (7) from above, where QC is now decomposed into its 
components   
  and   
 : 16 
     
    
  
    
    
    
  
    
    (11) 
If WINI falls by say 20 percent, then only   
  will fall by 20 percent, but that would 
only make, say, 5 percent of QC, which is reasonable since the wage bill in the I-sector is 
much smaller than the wage bill in the C-sector (in the US, for example, investment is only 
about 17 percent of GDP, while consumption comprises about 69 percent). Now, if QC falls 
by 5 percent, then WCNC will also fall proportionately. This means that the first fraction of 
equation (10) remains the same, but the second is markedly smaller. Prices of consumer 
goods PC have fallen. This shows that in a two sector economy, a collapse in investment has 
a strong deflationary effect on prices. If we use equation (9), all we are saying is that the 
markup over direct costs has fallen, because ΔWINI >ΔWCNC 
     
    
  
 1   
    
    
    (9)
  
Note that in this scenario we have lost jobs from both the I- and C-sectors and profits 
have declined by the amount of the drop in investment.  
Now let us reverse the analysis and explore what happens if investment rises. In this 
case, WINI will rise and so will πC, which will produce a multiplier effect and cause   
  to 
increase and QC and NC to rise, but by a smaller percentage.  In this case, the markup will 
rise, since the percent increase in WINI exceeds that of WCNC (ΔWINI >ΔWCNC). The ratio 
WCNC/QC remains unchanged because both NC and QC rise by the same amount (even if 
proportionately less than WINI, as per our assumption), but because of the increase in the 
markup, a rise in investment produces a rise in prices. This is our first indication that an 17 
investment-led expansion is inflationary. It can be easily verified that a consumption-led 
expansion will have a taming influence on the markup.    
Note, however, that normally in most economies, wages in the investment sector tend 
to be higher than wages in the consumption sector.
9 This means that if there is a 20 percent 
increase in the wage bill of both the C- and I-sectors, there will be a smaller employment-
creation effect in the I-sector because their wages weigh more. Relatively speaking, directing 
the same amount of demand toward investment rather than consumption would yield a 
smaller employment effect (ΔNI < ΔNC). 
This also means that, in conditions of less than full employment (NI+NC<NF),
10 
policies that produce an investment (as opposed to a consumption) boom would create 
proportionately greater inflationary effects, but with proportionately smaller employment 
effects. In the off-chance that we are at full employment (NF), an increase in employment in 
the I-sector will be accompanied by a decline in employment in the C-sector. This relative 
redistribution of employment would cause the price increase to be even greater than in the 
below-full-employment scenario above. This result also indicates how in modern economies, 
unemployment is used as an inflation-inhibiting tool.  
Be that as it may, can we envision a level of investment growth that would eventually 
get us to full employment? This is a highly unlikely scenario, but hypothetically possible, as 
long as firms enjoy perpetual investment optimism, i.e., profit expectations are sustained and 
improving. This, of course, is rather difficult to achieve not the least because, as Keynes had 
                                                 
9 Investment sector jobs, as in manufacturing, still remain relatively more unionized and command higher wage 
and benefit packages than in the consumption sector, where low-wage service sector jobs comprise an ever 
increasing share of C-sector employment. 
10 NF signifies full employment hereafter. 18 
reminded us, the marginal efficiency of capital (mec) declines when the market is flooded 
with capital goods. But even if expectations do not falter, a prolonged investment boom may 
eventually produce full employment at the expense of increasing prices and profits and, 
therefore, at the expense of increasingly more inequitable distribution of income. But as we 
know, a perpetual investment boom cannot be relied upon to sustain full employment even if 
it were achieved. In fact, because investment is, by far, the most volatile component of 
aggregate demand, profits and employment too will be unstable. Note from (7) above that     
π = I. When investment is volatile, so are aggregate profits. Profits in modern economies, 
and profit expectations, in particular, have a special role to play, as they determine the offer 
of employment. And if falling profits depress expectations of future profits as well, 
investment (and employment) will fall even further.  
Such a basic two-sector model describes a system with volatile prices PC, investment 
I, profits π, employment N, and income distribution. It is also a system in which idle capacity 
is the normal condition, NI+NC<NF and one which is prone to sizeable inflationary and 
deflationary forces. It is a model that describes earlier (pre-WWI) market economies, when 
neither government spending nor trade are contributing much to final demand. In such a 
system, bringing the economy to full employment via investment stimuli will add to the 
markup on consumer prices (i.e., via a relatively more inflationary method of producing full 
employment), whereas increasing output and employment in the C-sector will have a 
dampening effect on prices.  
The above two-sector model refers to the simplest aggregate equation, where output 
is the sum of consumption and investment (Y = C + I), which can be augmented by adding 19 
government demand (Y = C + I+ G). In the prewar period, total federal government spending 
comprised less than 3 percent of total output, hardly an influence on total demand and not 
enough to offset fluctuations in private demand. As government spending ballooned in the 
postwar period, the share of government spending in GDP has varied from 46 percent during 
World War II to 27 percent today. With its new expanded roles and responsibilities, the 
government sector has been able, by exercising its discretionary spending power, to help 
stabilize prices, profits, and employment.  
The relatively large share of government spending in GDP means that sizeable 
fluctuations in investment can be offset by discretionary spending.  But by doing so, the 
government can also impart an important inflationary bias on the system. This is what 
Minsky referred to as the role of government as a “blessing and a curse” (Minsky 1986, 283).  
The much needed stabilization effect of government has also made the economy more 
susceptible to inflationary forces. To understand the inflationary bias of government, one 
must understand 1) the government’s effect on the size and distribution of final demand and 
2) the government’s effect on the financial system and the resources available for financing 
private investment. This second effect is of critical import in a monetary production 
economy, but we will abstract from it for the moment, to focus on how different types of 
government spending affect the composition of final demand, and therefore the markup, 
employment, and income distribution. 
11 
                                                 
11 For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of different fiscal policies on inflation and income distribution 
one must also deal with the linkages between government spending and the financial system as suggested by 
Minsky (1986). 20 
3. THE BASIC THREE-SECTOR MODEL WITH CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT, 
AND GOVERNMENT 
We already know that demand from income generated in sectors other than the consumer 
goods sector adds to the markup. Thus, it is easy to extend the analysis above and to 
anticipate, even before deriving the equations, a greater overall markup on consumer prices, 
by adding government. But the size of the markup will be different depending on the 
different government policy employed. As we compare the effects of transfer payments and 
the direct and indirect employment effects from government spending, we will make the 
following assumptions. For comparison purposes, we will initially assume that wages in all 
sectors are the same, WI=WC=WG. We will later relax this assumption to make it more 
realistic, especially as we discuss the role of “price rules.” Secondly, for simplicity of 
exposition, I will initially abstract from taxes, in order to compare different government 
policies without confusing the reader with the implications of “after-tax income.” Later, I 
will add taxes back to the price equation to show how consumer income taxes reduce the 
markup, but profit taxes increase it. Thus, the analysis assumes, in line with the historically-
normal condition, that the government will run deficits.
12 
                                                 
12 Note that this assumption of deficits should constitute the base scenario for any analysis. As the Lavoie-
Godley stock-flow consistent model illustrates, private sector surpluses (foreign and domestic) must necessarily 
be offset by public sector deficits. The existence of large foreign savings and (normally) positive personal 
savings has been made possible by deficit spending (Godley and Lavoie 2007). Conversely, in the presence of 
trade deficits, the government surplus during the late 90s was realized only due to the large negative savings 
posture of the private domestic sector (Wray 2002). Separately, the Chartalist contributions make it clear that 
government spending provides tax credits to the private sector, which denominates its transactions in state 
money (Mosler 1997-98). Deficits provide net new financial assets to the private sector, which tends to hoard a 
portion of them. Therefore, the normal condition of the budget stance is to run a deficit; surpluses in a given 
accounting period are limited to the size of previously run deficits (Wray 1999). 
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I will first examine the two cases in which the government provides transfer 
payments. In the first idealized case, the transfer payments are only in the form of 
unemployment insurance to those who have been laid off (TRUI). In the second idealized 
case, government only provides investment subsidies to firms (TRIS). The two scenarios will 
examine the effect of the two policies on prices, profits, and income distribution. 
3.1  Government Spending on Transfer Payments to Individuals in the Form of 
Unemployment Insurance: TRUI 
We know that consumer goods production must satisfy the demand of wage earners in the C-
sector and I-sector as well as those of non-wage earners. Suppose now that investment has 
collapsed, leading to a fall in WINI and πI. We know that, after the multiplier effect, output 
and employment in the C-sector will also fall, but by a proportionately smaller amount. 
Collapsing investment produces a depressing effect on consumer prices, profits, and 
employment. Suppose however that those who have been laid off from the I-sector are now 
paid unemployment insurance by the government, such that ΔWINI=ΔTRUI. In reality, of 
course, unemployment insurance is only a fraction of the lost wage bill from unemployment, 
and we will address this issue below, but for now it should be clear that because 
unemployment insurance replaces the lost wage bill in the investment sector, income to the 
working class in the system is restored, but not employment. Because this injection in 
unemployment insurance goes directly to the C-sector, it restores profits πC, produces a small 
multiplier effect, and induces the C-sector to rehire those workers who were laid off when 
part of QC (namely the part of   
  that went unsold after the collapse in investment).  
Therefore, unemployment insurance recovers PC, πC, and the small decline in WCNC, but it 22 
does not recover πI or WINI. Such an unemployment insurance policy brings the markup back 
to its previous level so that the price system can now redistribute output between those who 
still have their jobs and those who lost theirs. As noted above, however, TRUI is usually far 
smaller than the lost wage bill in the I-sector; it is also only a temporary safety net. This 
means that it will not normally restore prices to their original level, though it will halt their 
fall. Neither is it going to produce the same employment effect in the C-sector after the 
multiplier if πC recover only marginally. This is also a temporary patch that forestalls the 
deflationary effect from collapsing investment and prevents further layoffs.  
I assumed that ΔTRUI=ΔWINI in order to show that price stability is possible without 
employment stability. This is why Keynes was so skeptical of income stabilizing policies 
which did not guarantee stabilization of employment. Suppose, however, that the government 
wants to stimulate the C-sector by pumping more demand, and does so by increasing 
unemployment insurance. We know that by virtue of the larger transfer payment, profits in 
the C-sector πC also increase. This produces a multiplier effect, generates some more 
production of C-goods and employment in the C-sector (but recall this is a proportionately 
smaller increase), and prices continue to rise since unemployment insurance (TRUI) adds 
directly to the markup. 
When we examine the two core equations above (7) and (9), but now add TRUI, we 
get: 
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From (13), the markup on consumer goods will depend on the relative wages and 
employment in the C- and I-sectors and the size of the transfer payment, relative to the wage 
bill in the C-sector. Note here that     
′ is the new, now lower, level of investment which 
necessitated the government intervention via unemployment insurance. Note also that 
whether you consider equation (12) or (13), TRUI still increases proportionately by more than 
either QC in equation (12) or WCNC in equation (13). 
Both equations show that pumping an increasing amount of aggregate demand via 
increasing expenditures on unemployment insurance would produce much faster price 
increases than the rise in output or employment in the C-sector. Growth in the C-sector 
production and employment will not be able to offset the inflationary effects of the 
unemployment insurance (UI) policy because the latter has relatively small employment-
creation effects (the denominator increases more slowly than the numerator). 
  A quick look at profits reveals that government deficit spending, which in our case 
equals unemployment insurance (i.e., Def = TRUI),
13 is a direct injection into aggregate 
profits. Now that we have three components of final demand, we can derive new equations 
for profits: 
PCQC=WCNC+    
′+ TRUI   (14) 
From here, profits in the C-sector are: 
                                                 
13 Recall that we have no taxes at the moment—government spends simply by issuing unemployment insurance 
checks.  24 
πC= PCQC-WCNC=    
′+ TRUI   (15) 
which yields: 
πC=     
′ + Def   (16) 
I=PIQI=    
′ +πI    or   πI = I -     
′                  (17) 
Therefore, adding (15) and (16), we get the familiar result that profits equal investment 
spending plus the deficit: 
π = I + Def   (18) 
This famous result illustrates that countercyclical government spending, in the presence of 
investment volatility, will stabilize profits. In our case, the job is done by unemployment 
insurance, but any government deficit spending will have this effect. 
   Unemployment insurance is an important safety-net for the immediate short term, but 
it is, by definition, not a pro-employment policy. It is a policy that provides nonwage income 
to the working population. One could argue that if ΔTRUI=ΔWINI (as per our assumption 
above), workers are no worse off than before. In reality, however, this is not the case, 
because unemployment insurance is far smaller than the wages lost from unemployment. 
Furthermore, it is not a genuine automatic stabilizer, because it expires well before the 
private sector has recovered sufficiently to provide employment for all. The singular 
characteristic of unemployment is that there are people who want to work but cannot find 
employment. It therefore represents forced idleness and no matter how humane or desirable 25 
short-run UI policies are, they are not a permanent or even a medium-term solution to the 
problem of unemployment. The job of the policy maker is to devise a pro-employment safety 
net that allows those individuals in forced idleness who want to work to find employment. It 
should be remembered that the dynamics of modern capitalist economies require that income 
is generated from employment and production and that, for this reason, in monetary 
production economies, livelihoods depend on income from work. Furthermore, the evils of 
unemployment are far too numerous to list here (see, e.g., Darity 1999; Forstater 1999) and 
unemployment insurance does very little to address them, other than keep the unemployed 
afloat for a brief period of time.   
So if the objective of the policy maker is to institute pro-employment policies, the 
next question to ask is: How does unemployment insurance compare with alternative 
government policies that aim to stimulate employment creation? 
3.2  Government Spending on Transfer Payments to Firms in the Form of Investment 
Subsidies: TRIS 
The second scenario to consider is one in which the government spends on transfers to firms 
in the form of investment subsidies, in hope that they will boost production and employment 
(TRIS). These subsidies could go directly to the I-sector or they could be given to the C-sector 
for the purpose of purchasing investment goods from the I-sector. So whether these transfers 
are supplied to the I-sector directly or indirectly via the C-sector, ultimately one would 
expect that if they indeed stimulate new investment that they would partially fund the wage 
bill associated with this new production and partially the profits earned from I-goods 
production: 26 
ΔTRIS = ΔWINI + ΔπI   (19) 
As expected, this would be a pro-profit policy because any increase in investment increases 
aggregate profits by the same amount. Of course, the newly created employment in the I-
sector will increase its demand for C-goods. Thus, after the multiplier effect, we can expect 
employment in the C-sector to increase as well, but by a proportionally lower amount than 
the new employment in the I-sector. Now, would such a transfer policy necessarily increase 
investment? This very much depends on the state of expectations and why investment fell in 
the first place. Giving investment subsidies to firms would reduce the supply price of capital, 
but if profit expectations and the marginal efficiency of capital are collapsing even faster than 
the falling cost of production, no net new investment would occur. There is evidence to 
suggest that investment subsidies only subsidize already planned investment, and do not 
result in net new hiring or investment projects (see Cannari, et al. 2006). 
  If the government decides to keep pumping transfer payments to the I-sector in order 
to further stimulate investment, we know that prices would rise faster than the C-sector could 
respond to alleviate these inflationary effects by increasing employment and production. 
Therefore, again, a pro-investment policy redistributes income away from the wage to the 
capital share in income. Is there a limit to the amount of transfer payments that need to be 
provided to the I-sector in order to generate full employment? Under the foregoing 
assumptions, if we pump enough demand, at some point, we would expect to get to full 
employment, but since much of these transfer payments leak into profits πC and πI, it is 
unclear how long and how large a profit boom is needed to produce the kind of job creation 
NC+NI that would absorb all of the unemployed into either sector.  27 
  Hypothetically, however, whether investment increases on its own, or transfer 
subsidies are provided for purchases of investment goods, the employment creation effects of 
each should be the same. When investment is insufficient to produce full employment or 
declines, Keynes proposed that the government step in to provide the requisite demand. He 
did not, however, favor that this be done via transfer payments to firms, which amounts to 
reducing the cost of investment, because there is still no guaranteed that sufficient demand 
would exist to buy the newly produced investment goods. We know that under modern 
accounting rules, investment goods produced but unsold are counted in inventory 
accumulation, which, for the purposes of national accounting, is considered to be an increase 
in investment.
14 Such a stock buildup, however, has an important negative effect on the 
marginal efficiency of capital and profit expectations. Sizeable inventory accumulation 
indicates decelerating aggregate demand and tends to depress future investment plans. Thus, 
a policy of transfer payments via investment subsidies could increase investment, GDP, and 
employment in the near term, but if this production goes unsold and accumulates in 
inventories, the stimulus effect will quickly be reversed in subsequent periods. Similar to 
unemployment insurance, investment subsidies may only prove to be a temporary fix. 
  The government could, of course, buy the inventory goods from the I-sector and 
could either stockpile them, let them decay, or destroy them. This would amount to fiscal 
policy via indirect job creation. So the next question to consider is how government transfer 
payments compare with government employment policies. I will explore two different types 
                                                 
14 To be more precise, in the US National Income and Product Accounts, change in business inventories 
represents the change in the physical volume of goods purchased by private business for use in the production 
of other commodities or for resale, valued in average prices of the period. This means that inventories could 
include both consumption and investment goods.  
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of government employment policies—those that have direct and indirect employment effects.  
A direct employment effect would be produced when the government hires the unemployed 
in the government sector; an indirect effect is when the government buys either consumption 
or investment goods from the private sector. Government purchases of investment goods 
from the I-sector is an indirect employment policy, where the government demand for I-
goods is expected to produce employment creation for the production of these goods. Thus, I 
will first look at the latter scenario —indirect job creation—which I will later compare to a 
direct job creation, specifically via the Employer of Last Resort. 
3.3  Government as an Employer via Indirect Job Creation 
If the government buys the unsold investment goods, whenever demand falters, the I-sector 
will always have a guaranteed source of demand and could keep producing I-goods, 
employing workers necessary to produce the output now consumed by the government 
(  
   
 ), and earning profits from producing for the government (π 
 ).   
Here, total profit is given by: 
π =πC+πI+πG   (20)  
The price level is:  
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Total government deficit spending is: 
Def =   
   
  + π 
    (22) 29 
Full employment NF could be sustained by a level of government spending sufficient to buy 
all the investment goods necessary to sustain this employment demand, which boost profits 
in the aggregate by πG.  
                 
   (23) 
Such a policy produces a wage bill in the I-sector, which is now larger by   
   
  and 
which adds to the markup. Prices are sustained at a higher level and so are profits.  
  But is there a better alternative? A government which buys I-goods and destroys them 
is essentially one which follows, for example, a policy of building bombs and stockpiling 
them or dropping them on other nations. Apart from the obvious moral problems with such a 
wasteful and hostile policy, we know that the employment creation effect for the same 
amount of spending is much smaller than if such spending were directed to the C-sector.  
What if the government bought all the consumption goods it could possibly buy from the C-
sector in order to maintain full employment and then either stockpiled, destroyed these C-
goods, or distributed them to the working poor? Now government spending changes to 
Def =   
   
  + π 
    (24) 
This policy is preferable to indirectly supporting employment in the I-sector, since the newly 
generated wage bill in the C-sector has a multiplier effect which will increase C-goods 
production for the private sector (not for government) and will therefore have a taming 
influence on the markup (see equation [25]). In addition, there is a positive effect from the 
government’s redistributive policy of C-goods to the poor. 30 
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This is a viable policy option but note that it, too, inflates profits (this time of the C-sector; 
see equation [24]) in order to entice firms to hire the unemployed. Such policies are difficult 
to implement because it is unclear what type of consumption goods industries should be 
stimulated by government spending in order to distribute the excess production to the needy.  
But, once again, with this policy too, if we pump enough demand, hypothetically, we should 
at some point get to full employment even at the cost of inflating C-sector profits.  
  All of the discussion so far completely ignores structural unemployment, which, as I 
have argued in previous work (Tcherneva 2011, 2012) was of critical importance to Keynes.  
So far, the analysis presumes that pumping enough demand will eventually, even at the cost 
of price and profit inflation, produce full employment. But in the face of structural 
unemployment, it will not matter how much demand we pump via unemployment insurance, 
investment subsidies, or government purchases of investment or consumption goods. At a 
certain point, the private sector will simply not be able to absorb all who want a job, 
especially if those who are left behind in the labor market are the so-called “unemployable” 
individuals. Here we come full circle back to Keynes’s Chapter 20 of the General Theory 
(1936), and his discussion of the employment function, where he clearly makes the case that, 
as we approach full employment, part of the increase in demand will be spent on output and 
production, and part will go directly to prices and profits. This could result either from 
production bottlenecks, or simply from the fact that demand is not directed to the “right” 
sectors. And to know the latter, we must know the employment creation effects of all sectors.  31 
This is one reason why industry targeting is controversial as a policy for development or for 
full employment.  
  Suppose, however, that we did know which industries had large employment creation 
effects, and government conscientiously purchased goods and services from these sectors in 
order to stimulate job creation in pursuit of full employment. Suppose one such industry is 
the sock production textile industry. The government may find itself in a position of 
stimulating sock production, creating jobs in sock factories, and distributing socks to the 
poor. Even if this policy is reasonably successful in reducing unemployment and bringing the 
economy close to full employment, is this a viable policy? Can we put resources to better 
use? Do the poor need so many socks? Are there other goods and services that they could 
benefit from? In reality, even the sock industry will refuse to hire the “unemployable”—i.e., 
those lacking characteristics desired by sock industry employers—and true full employment 
would not be achieved. In addition, the output that the government is busy redistributing to 
the poor may not be as valuable as some other products they may need. This rather silly 
example illustrates how this kind of government planning is not likely to succeed. This is not 
to say that government should not attempt to discern the employment creation effects of 
different industries or to undertake redistributive policies. No, all of these are rather useful 
and sorely lacking in many developed but deregulated nations, such as in post-Reagan US.  
The example illustrates that the goals of production and redistribution of different types of 
output are not necessarily the ones that will produce true full employment.   
There is a policy option that addresses structural and cyclical unemployment 
problems well, absorbs all the unemployed and unemployable, and does so more cheaply 32 
than all of the alternatives that have been presented so far—this policy is the employer of last 
resort. 
3.4  Government Direct Job Creation via the Employer of Last Resort Program 
This policy immediately secures full employment by giving a job to all who want one. It is a 
policy that does not attempt to fit the unemployed workers to a particular consumption goods 
or investment goods industry, but is a policy that, instead, fits public sector jobs to the 
unemployed and unemployable. Even the most unskilled person can do something in the 
public sector that can contribute to social welfare and the public good, while simultaneously 
beginning to learn new skills, gain new work experience, and enhance their own human 
capital which will make them more employable in the eyes of private employers. The design 
and administration of such a program have been discussed at length in the literature. One 
feature of the ELR that this author has advocated is to allow the unemployed and poor 
themselves to actively participate in the proposal and design of the needed community 
projects with the help of the nonprofit sector, in order to minimize the managerial and 
administrative difficulties the federal government may face in executing these projects 
(Tcherneva 2006).  
In this section, I will assume, as is frequently discussed in the ELR literature, that the 
government pays a base wage which is exogenously fixed (Mosler 1997-8; Mitchell 1998; 
Wray 1998).
15 Wages in the C- and I-sectors will be higher to make employment in those 
sectors more attractive. This has also been empirically demonstrated in the case of Argentina, 
which is the closest contemporary example to an ELR-type program, albeit a limited one (see 
                                                 
15 Some have suggested that the floor should be set at the living wage level, Tcherneva (2006). 33 
e.g., Tcherneva and Wray 2005).  In the case of Argentina, all those who were hired out of 
the government public employment program into the private sector were employed at a 
premium above the ELR wage.  
The immediately obvious difference between the employer of last resort (ELR) policy 
and the earlier indirect job creation government policies is that government spending does 
not leak into profits of either the C- or I-sectors. Compare the deficit associated with the ELR 
program with that of the alternative policies. The deficit levels are: 
DefELR=           (26) 
DefC =   
   
  + π 
    (24) 
DefI =   
   
  + π 
    (22) 
If DefELR, DefC and DefI are the full employment levels of government spending from these 
three policies (ELR, stimulating C-sector employment by purchasing C-goods, and 
stimulating I-sector employment by buying I-goods), we can expect these expenditures to be 
ranked in the following fashion: 
DefELR < DefC < DefI . 
The pro-investment policy generates the largest deficit DefI, because it has the 
smallest employment creation effects; thus, a lot more government spending is required to 
get the economy to full employment NF.  This is because investment is a small percentage of 
GDP, and because much of the government spending is absorbed by the higher wage (recall 
that I-sector workers command the highest wages WI>WC>WELR, which means that the same 
amount of government spending is distributed more toward wages and less towards 
employment). Furthermore, DefC exceeds DefELR, because wages in the C-sector are greater 34 
than those from ELR employment, and because part of the government spending leaks into 
C-sector profits.
16 Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the smallest amount of government 
spending will be associated with the direct job creation policy.  
So, if the government decides to act as an employer of last resort, what happens to the 
rest of the economy? WELRNELR is still income earned in a non-consumption goods industry 
but spent on consumption goods, which adds to the markup and to C-sector profits, albeit by 
less than when we attempted to get to full employment by pumping government demand for 
C-goods (this is because WC > WELR and because none of the government ELR stimulus leaks 
immediately into profits). ELR will also have some multiplier effects, i.e., it will increase the 
wage bill and production in the C-sector (WCNC and QC) which means that either WINI will 
fall as the C-sector hires away workers from the I-sector (remember that we are now at full 
employment) or WELRNELR will fall for the same reason. In both cases, the markup will fall.  
But if the C-sector hires from the ELR pool, then spending on ELR is even smaller than that 
from the alternative fiscal policies. The size of the government deficit matters not because of 
some budgetary constraints the government faces, but because a smaller government deficit 
will add less to the profit share of income and to the markup. Furthermore, the Chartalist 
literature stresses that it is important to know what government spending actually buys 
because we will be able to discern how the government supplies its currency to the non-
government sector. When we stimulate the production of consumption goods via DefC, the 
deficit is spent partially on the newly created wage bill in the C-sector (Δ  
   
 ) and 
                                                 
16 Recall that the ELR hires at a base wage, which would serve as the effective minimum wage (Wray 1998).  
Hiring away from this pool of employed workers occurs at a premium over the ELR wage, as demonstrated in 
the case of Argentina (Tcherneva and Wray 2005). 
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partially on profits earned from producing for the government (Δ  
 ). When we stimulate 
investment (DefI), government spending produces a new wage bill in the I-sector (Δ  
   
 , 
where spending now buys more “expensive” workers) and new profit from producing for the 
government Δ  
 . With ELR, we know that government spending pays only for the wage bill 
of the ELR workers where, regardless of the size of the public sector labor force, one hour of 
work is always set at the base ELR wage     . As Keynes argued, in dealing with a theory 
of employment, we “can make use of only two fundamental units of quantity, namely, 
quantities of money-value and quantities of employment” (Keynes 1936, 41).  If quantity of 
employment is measured in terms of labor-units and the money wage of a labor unit is the 
wage unit, then we can deal with the behavior of the economic system as a whole by 
measuring output by the employment that went into its production and its relative 
remuneration.
17,18  From a Chartalist perspective, if the ELR wage sets the terms of exchange 
between the ordinary labor unit and the base wage, then we have an anchor of “value” of the 
currency and we will know exactly how much work one unit of currency (provided via 
government spending) is worth. With ELR, we create a benchmark for the ratio between the 
ordinary labor unit and the base wage.  
Here is the ex-post price relationship for consumer goods with ELR.  
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17 Here Keynes took “ordinary labor” as the base measure of the labor unit (i.e., one unskilled worker), where 
more skilled and specialized labor units are remunerated according to some proportion in relation to the base 
unit. In other words, if a specialized unit is remunerated at double the rates of a base unit, then it will count as 
two ordinary labor units.  
18 This is yet another validation of Keynes’s unique method of analysis, which has been discussed elsewhere 
(Tcherneva 2011, 2012). Keynes insisted that output is measured in terms of number of people employed, 
which was consistent with his commitment to “on-the-spot” employment policies.  
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  Compare it with the price equation from the pro-Investment government policy 
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Because   
   
  is larger than         , the markup is also larger.  A policy that 
pumps increasing amounts of investment demand to produce full employment is bound to be 
more inflationary than ELR.  
The price equation from the fiscal policy which stimulated consumption goods 
production is: 
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The first fraction does not change after we add the demand from government because the 
numerator and denominator increase proportionately, but the second fraction is now smaller, 
which is why we argued above that this pro-consumption goods policy has a taming effect on 
the markup, even as it inflates profits. 
This result was to be expected since this is a policy of flooding the market with 
consumption goods. The problem, however, remains that we may not know which 
consumption goods industries to target and, even if we did, the structurally unemployed and 
those who are believed to be unemployable, may still remain without jobs, no matter how 
large the government spending. With ELR, however, we address both problems directly but 
at the cost of producing a higher but stable markup. By contrast, the markup from 
unemployment insurance, investment subsidies, or purchases of investment goods from the I-
sector is not only higher than that from the ELR policy, but it is also rising, because as the 
economy approaches full capacity, an increasing amount of spending on each of these 37 
policies is necessary to secure true full employment (recall much of it directly leaks into 
profits and prices). With the ELR policy in place, we know exactly how much spending is 
required to employ all the jobless who wish to work, whereas through any of the alternative 
policies we do not how large a demand would be required to encourage the private sector to 
secure and maintain true full employment.   
Even though the markup from the ELR policy is the most stable, if its size were a 
concern for any reason, there is a way to reduce it.  This can be done by having the ELR 
program produce consumption goods which will absorb part of the wage bill of either ELR 
workers or those from other sectors. In a sense we are still flooding the market with 
consumption goods, but we do not have to figure out which C-industry has high 
employment-output elasticities and, after we do, still run the risk of flooding the market with 
the “wrong” kind of C-goods. 
With the ELR, we can let the ELR participants determine the kind of consumption 
goods and services that are most needed in the poor communities and organize production in 
the ELR sector around those needs. This was done very effectively in Argentina where the 
participating workers produced many goods and services that were either sold in the market 
or distributed free of charge to the poor.   
Finally, we need to relate consumer goods prices to the ELR wage and the relative 
employment shares in the three sectors (C-sector, I-sector, and G-sector).  With ELR the ex-
post equation is the following: 
PCQC = WCNC + WINI + WELRNELR   (28) 38 
Where the total consumption goods production is given by the consumer goods produced in 
the private sector (  
 ) and those produced by the ELR program (  
   ). In other words, 
       
      
      (29) 
We also know that the ELR wage will be the base wage and that the C- or I-sectors can 
always hire workers at a premium over the ELR wage. Therefore,  
WC = (1+α)WELR    (30) 
WI=(1+β)WELR   (31) 
where β > α. 
Given these conditions, we can derive PC by substituting equations (29), (30) and (31) into 
equation (28). Thus, we can express the price level as a function of the ELR wage (WELR), the 
relative employment shares in different sectors, and the ratio between the premia charged 
over the ELR wage in the C and I-sectors α and β. Let us derive it: 
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We can simplify further: 39 
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Equation (35) is our fundamental equation for a full employment economy with an 
ELR type policy. It illustrates a full employment condition NELR+NC+NI=NF, where the 
multiplier is implicit. If the ELR wage rises, so will prices PC, which is why the modern ELR 
proposal emphasizes that the ELR wage must serve as an anchor and would be raised 
discretionarily, but should not be indexed to prices. Any discretionary rise in the WELR would 
produce a one-time jump in prices, but wage-price indexation will likely render the ELR 
policy inflationary and will ensure that the ELR wage is no longer an anchor to prices and 
wages in the economy. PC could also rise if the private sector wants to bid up its own wages, 
i.e., the C- and I-sectors keep increasing α and β. Furthermore, inflationary effects can be 
observed if employment in the I-sector rises faster than employment in the C-sector. If this 
occurs and the ELR pool does not change, then we can expect production of consumer goods 
to decline somewhat if workers are now redirected to investment goods production. This 
decline in QC, will fuel the inflationary effect of the investment boom. But it is unlikely that 
the ELR employment and production will remain unchanged. If there is indeed an investment 
boom which hires workers away from the C-sector, the demand for QC will not decline; it 
may, in fact, increase if these workers now command higher wages from I-sector 
employment and can increase their standard of living. This means that QC will not fall (it 
may actually increase) and the production of these new goods will have to be done by 
somebody. In this scenario, then, it is likely that the C-sector will hire away workers from the 
ELR sector in order to satisfy the demand for consumer goods. Another way of seeing this is 40 
to say that as NI increases and WINI increases, so will πC. This, in turn, will prompt the C-
sector to hire from the ELR pool in order to boost QC production. So as NI rises, NELR falls 
and serves as a countercyclical stabilizer to prices. But because I-sector workers command 
higher wages WI=(1+β)WELR, there will still be small upward pressure on the markup and 
prices from this private-sector driven investment boom. Output of consumer goods may 
remain the same or may increase as workers move from the ELR industry to the C-sector.  
Conversely, when investment collapses, NI falls but NELR expands. Thus, the ELR 
program offsets the deflationary pressures from falling investment demand. Because the ELR 
wage is lower than WI, this offsetting effect is only partial. Furthermore, as WINI falls, πC also 
falls and so will   
  after the multiplier effect. But since the ELR pool has now expanded, so 
has ELR production of C-goods   
   , which partially sustains the output of C-goods, as 
workers move between sectors. Apart from the other benefits of ELR that have been 
explained elsewhere in the literature (Minsky 1986; Wray 1998; Mitchell 1998; Forstater 
1999; Mosler 1997-98; Tcherneva 2006), this simple Kaleckian model allows us to see the 
price stabilization feature of a government policy that attains and maintains full employment.   
In other words, with the ELR in place, under conditions of full employment, price 
increases result when the private sector expands and government shrinks. Conversely, when 
employment in the C- and I-sectors falls, it is immediately absorbed in the ELR labor force, 
which prevents the markup from collapsing, while at the same time it stabilizes prices. In 
other words, the markup falls by less than in the absence of ELR. Government ELR policy 
can be seen as taming the markup. There are, of course, other government and non-41 
government factors that can produce inflation, but inflation, it must be emphasized, does not 
result from the ELR program.  
The ELR is a policy that favors wage incomes and consumption. It is a policy that 
does not rely on fueling the profits of the private sector in order to generate employment and, 
as such, it yields better income distribution than the alternatives. It is a cheaper policy option 
that tames the inflationary and deflationary effects from changes in investment demand, 
while maintaining full employment. It sets a clear ceiling to government spending, as 
spending stops once all of the jobless who wish to work have been hired. By contrast, 
priming the pump or directing demand to private sector production requires larger deficits 
because some of these deficits will leak into profits and most of the spending will go first 
towards hiring more “expensive” and generally employable workers. Near full capacity, it is 
possible that no amount of government demand will entice the private sector to hire the least 
skilled and least educated workers, thereby ensuring that all new demand will go directly into 
prices and profits.  
 
4. GOVERNMENT POLICIES TODAY 
Today, governments perform all of the different types of fiscal policies discussed so far 
except for the ELR option. In the US, the government provides unemployment insurance to 
the unemployed for a limited duration, transfer payments in the form of large (direct and 
indirect) subsidies for military production, direct purchases of military consumption and 
investment output, while increasingly outsourcing its operations to the private sector, and 
therefore steadily diminishing the amount of public sector employment (mostly federal).  42 
Direct job creation is virtually non-existent. From the model presented here, it is clear that all 
of these policies add to the markup when they result in large deficits, all of them boost 
profits, and none of them have so far achieved or sustained a full employment level of output.  
The only time of true full employment in the US was during World War II, when the 
government did indeed serve as the employer of last resort, extending its peace-time 
Depression-era New Deal policies to the war effort. But this type of government ELR is not 
what any economist envisions. From Keynes to Minsky to all modern advocates of direct 
employment, full employment can and must be organized around civilian purposes in a way 
to serve the needs of modern societies during peacetime. All of the other peacetime fiscal 
policy alternatives have considerable inflationary bias, even as they stabilize profits and put a 
floor on incomes and layoffs. This is why Minsky called Big Government “a blessing and a 
curse.” Profits and prices recover and even increase, but without achieving or maintaining 
full employment.  
4.1  Trade Deficits, Taxes, Consumption out of Profits, and Saving out of Wages 
The discussion so far ignored several factors. First, we have omitted taxes. All of our 
equations can be amended to include taxes on wages, which reduce the markup by reducing 
the disposable income of each sector’s workers. Furthermore, if we include savings out of 
wages, the markup will be even lower. In cases such as in the US, which experienced 
negative saving rates during the late 1990s and early 2000s (i.e., consumption financed by 
borrowing had consistently exceeded incomes during that time), the negative saving rate has 
actually added to the markup—again a source of inflation from the private-sector. All 
equations can also be amended to include purchases of imports which will reduce the 43 
markup, since the domestic wage bill is partially spent of foreign-produced consumer goods.  
This is, to some extent, the reason why the inflationary effects of large household dissaving 
and government deficits have not been manifested in the US.
 19 In effect, trade deficits in the 
US serve to export domestic inflation to our trading partners.  
Finally, all equations must include profit taxes, which would add to the markup. This 
is because any taxes on the employer are treated as costs of production, which must be 
recaptured by the price system; e.g., social security taxes and employer pension contributions 
must be added to labor costs. Thus, prices could rise, even without increases in investment or 
government deficit spending if such taxes are increasingly imposed on producers, who in turn 
attempt to recover them by marking up their direct costs by the amount of the tax increase 
(Minsky 1986, 149). Finally, we must add consumption out of profits, which in modern 
economies is a sizeable and important addition to the markup. 
The importance of consumption spending out of profits is that it feeds back into 
aggregate profitability and essentially reproduces itself. In modern economies, consumption 
out of profits takes the form of what Minsky called overhead or ancillary labor—that is, labor 
not directly linked to the production of capital assets. Recall that up to now, part of the 
surplus generated in the C-sector is spent on purchases of capital assets. But this surplus need 
not be allocated to the production of investment goods; it may go to support military 
production or an elaborate corporate bureaucracy, or as Minsky argued—to the building of 
Versailles (Ibid., 153). More importantly, in the modern era, the new competition based on 
                                                 
19 Note that in the late 90s, the government actually reduced deficits drastically and moved briefly into surplus. 
This stance quickly reversed after the 2001 recession, which, coupled with the “War on Terror,” has produced 
once again large government deficits.  
 44 
volume of sales and size of market share, has necessitated large expenditures on advertising, 
marketing, and research, all of which produce income which is derived from consumption 
out of profit, but is spent on consumption goods. Thus, the markup will be greater with ever 
increasing consumption out of profits. Thus, Minsky argued that “an increasing dominance of 
markets by firms with market power due to and sustained by advertising, product 
development, and sales efforts produces inflationary pressures” (Ibid., 155). Although all of 
these expenditures result in the allocation of the surplus to wages and salaries, they also 
represent costs of production to firms which must be recovered by the price system (Ibid.).  
Such an inflationary process has a particular aspect that makes it self-perpetuating. As the 
wages derived from consumption out of profits are spent on consumption goods, they result 
in increased profits. Therefore, the more firms spend out of profits, the more they increase 
their profitability by inflating the markup. This is why Minsky argued that this process leads 
to a form of self-fulfilling prophecy: “in the aggregate the greater the amount of such 
spending, the more firms can afford to spend in this way” (Ibid., 156). Saving out of wages 
will mitigate this process, however, since the wages of executive, managerial, and other 
overhead or ancillary workers tend to be higher, and so, too, are their marginal propensities 
to save, which reduce the cash flows available for profit income (Ibid.). 
Any of the previously discussed alternative fiscal policies, which attempt to secure 
full employment by boosting the profits of the private sector, in fact, prove to be even more 
inflationary than already discussed because part of the newly generated profits will be 
consumed. For the purposes of our present model, consumption out of profits is very 45 
important, because it indicates how much more inflationary those fiscal policies that fuel 
private sector profitability are.  
Consistent with Minsky (1986), we can now derive our modern day price equation: 
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Where BTDEF is the trade deficit,    are profits from export production,    are profit taxes, 
and    and     are consumption out of after-tax-profits and savings out of after-tax-wages, 
respectively. 
In the above equation: 
                       
   
      
   
      
      
              (37) 
where    are taxes on all wage incomes and    are taxes on all profits π—not just those 
earned from producing for the government (  
      
 ).  
The result of present day fiscal policies is that they have failed to guarantee full 
employment, even as they manage to support and inflate prices and profits. If we add the 
ELR, we can expect to reduce the need for deficit spending on some of the other government 
programs, such as unemployment insurance, but it is unlikely that investment subsidies and 
military spending will be curbed substantially, unless there is a major shift in policy. 
Therefore, any inflationary effect from government spending that occurs in the presence of 
an ELR will come from sources other than the ELR.  
4.2  Market Power and Pricing 
So far, we have only alluded to firm market power, which was important in Kalecki’s income 
distribution analysis. Note that if, when demand flows to firms, they are able to respond by 46 
raising prices rather than employment and output, then all government spending will flow 
directly into profits. Firms with sizeable market power will probably do both, which still 
means that a greater proportion of government spending will result in greater increases in 
profit margins than in employment. In such cases, fiscal policy could keep pumping demand 
but have an even smaller employment creation effect than indicated above. If a firm has a 
significant market power (say it is the monopolist in military goods production), then it could 
try to charge the highest possible price for the goods it sells to the government in order to 
extract the highest possible profit.
20 Furthermore, over the long run, profit-seeking 
enterprises will likely restructure production to favor automation and labor-replacing 
technologies, so that increasingly higher profits are extracted from producing for government 
(which is a guaranteed source of demand) by reducing their labor costs. Whether firms 
extract maximum profit πG from government by raising the price of consumption or 
investment output produced for government (  
       
  
 in the short run, or by utilizing labor-
replacing technology in the long run, both will further exacerbate income inequality.  
With greater market power of firms, an even greater government deficit will be 
required to produce full employment because a much greater proportion of the stimulus 
would leak into profits. If there is no ceiling or cap on profits earned from producing for the 
government (and in the contemporary policy environment of “no-bid contracts,” this is not an 
unreasonable assumption), there may also be no specific ceiling to government spending if 
fiscal policy is committed to pumping enough demand to produce full employment via such a 
pro-investment policy. By contrast, in the ELR case, there is a clear limit to deficit spending.  
                                                 
20 A recent study finds that contracting out to private firms is more expensive for the federal government than if 
the government were to hire the workers directly to do the job (Project on Government Oversight 2011).  47 
First, there is no leakage into a bottomless desire for profits. Secondly, as soon as NELR 
absorbs all the unemployed, such that NC+NI+NELR=NF, deficit spending stops and no longer 
adds to the markup.   
In the modern era, government makes a sizeable contribution to the markup, which is 
why Minsky called government “an engine of inflation.” The above analysis is entirely 
different from the neoclassical interpretation of government crowding-out effects, central 
bank monetization of government debt, or large helicopter drops of money chasing too few 
goods as forces of inflation. It is an interpretation of the relative nominal wages and 
employment shares in different sectors. It is an approach that allows us to study firm and 
union market power in the determination of income distribution and firm power in the 
determination of aggregate profits.  
5.  GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND “PRICE RULES” 
From the analysis so far, it is becoming clear that how government spends and what it buys is 
of crucial importance for income and inflation determination. This differential impact 
depends on how much it pays for a particular good or service or, in the ELR case, for labor.  
Thus the foregoing analysis can be complemented with a price-rule axiom, which states that 
government spending must adopt a price-rule that involves the least amount of income and 
price distortions and the greatest amount of job creation.  
The rule that government spending follows currently is a budget rule, but since the 
government financial balance (i.e., the deficit or the surplus) is endogenously determined (as 
tax collections and automatic countercyclical spending depend on economic activity, not on 48 
direct government policy), the government effectively follows a spending rule. That is, 
spending caps are placed on various items as they are appropriated in the budgetary process.  
In recessions, certain expenditures increase automatically. If such countercyclical measures 
are deemed inadequate, the government may authorize emergency measures to help things 
along. Tax rebate checks, for example, are a favored discretionary policy that aims to inject 
quick cash in the economy. This approach is no different from the income transfer approach 
above. There are some proposals to boost the amount and length of unemployment insurance 
received. In the aggregate, these are all approaches that favor profits over wages, which in 
normal circumstances would impart an inflationary bias on the economy.  
This “something for nothing” income transfer approach has another destabilizing 
feature. From a Chartalist perspective, we know that taxes create demand for state currency; 
a sizeable imbalance between tax collections and transfer payments, suggests that 
government injects liabilities “for free” in an economy that usually works to “earn” them to 
pay the tax. This erodes the value of the currency, as seems to have been the case in 
numerous countries around the world (for details see Hudson 2003). For this reason, 
Chartalists have always preferred to tie the provision of the currency to something specific, 
such as one hour of performed work. Chartalists suggest that this approach will anchor the 
value of the currency and, if coupled with an ELR policy, the ELR labor force can serve as 
the buffer-stock that maintains the currency’s value (Mosler 1997-98; Mitchell 1998; Wray 
1998). Although Keynes, a self-proclaimed Chartalist, did not link the value of the currency 
with such an ELR program, his whole methodology and approach to fiscal policy as a tool 
for directly targeting labor demand suggests precisely such a rule—that spending must be 49 
limited, not to some arbitrary budget caps, but to programs that directly absorb labor up to 95 
to 100 percent capacity via an “on the spot” (or direct) job creation (Tcherneva 2011).  
In the absence of an ELR policy, government spending on direct job creation is still 
more stabilizing than spending on transfers or investment goods, but it does not constitute a 
full employment policy, which, as Keynes had argued, should be the objective of fiscal 
policy. Finally, government spending on investment goods should also follow some rule, 
such that the costs and employment creation associated with every government contract are 
carefully monitored, monopoly pricing is limited, and the size of profits that could be earned 
from producing for government is also restrained. 
As already discussed above, in conditions of full employment, the government base 
wage becomes the anchor for all labor inputs in all sectors. But if the WELR is indexed, it 
would stop serving as an anchor for PC and would impart a strong inflationary bias on 
prices. As Minsky explained, there are two main types of inflation:  
In one, prices rise, even as increases in money wages lag behind prices; in the 
second, prices rise as money wage increases keep up with or even lead prices. 
When the determinants of the markup rise relative to the output of consumer 
goods, then prices rise relative to wages and the purchasing power of wages 
falls. This type of inflation does not feed on itself. (Minsky 1986, 259) 
In the case of wage indexation, we are linking, by design, price changes to wage 
changes, thereby guaranteeing a spiral inflationary process. This is what Minsky called open 
inflation, where rising prices induce wage increases, which lead to additional costs and thus 
price rises. Such an inflationary effect will be exacerbated overtime as inflation expectations 
become entrenched in the minds of workers and employers, making it doubly more difficult 
to halt such an open inflation.   50 
But if government uses a discretionary rule for wage increases, e.g., WELR is 
periodically revised up (say, every 5-10 years, which is still more frequent than the historical 
revisions in the minimum wage), then any increase in the markup will be a one-time 
adjustment that does not constitute inflation. Discretionary increases do not produce the same 
automatic inflationary effects as indexation. A stable ELR wage is a stable anchor for prices.  
Only in conditions of full employment can we be certain of the inflationary and employment 
effects of government policy. To do so, the ELR wage should be exogenously fixed and 
changed discretionarily, whereby government spending must be allowed to fluctuate with the 
level of ELR employment. This is what has been succinctly called the “fixed price/flexible 
quantity” rule by Mosler (1997-98). 
A final word is in order with regard to profits. Notice that it is the government deficit, 
not government spending, that enters the profits equation. Deficits, as well as all of the above 
relationships, are ex-post results, leaving employment to rest solely on profit determination, 
which leads to a rather unstable system. With ELR, full employment is guaranteed, whereby 
the inflationary influences on the markup from government are controlled. Moreover, the 
government ELR program imparts countercyclical price stabilization even if it does not 
eliminate all sources of inflation entirely (namely those which emerge from changes in 
private demand). ELR will, however, eliminate the need for a wide range of income transfers 
that are currently used to support the unemployed and the poor. As Minsky continually 
emphasized, if we are serious about poverty eradication, pro-employment, not pro-income 
policies are needed (Minsky 1968; see also Bell and Wray 2004). With an ELR, full 
employment is guaranteed and price stability is strengthened through the program’s 51 
countercyclical mechanism. In conditions of true full employment, over the short and long 
run, economists would still need to devise comprehensive anti-inflationary policies that 
would deal with private sector generated inflation.
21  
                                                 
21 See Lerner’s MAPs (Lerner and Colander 1980) and Vickrey’s TIPs programs (Vickrey 1986) as examples of 
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